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MARSHALLING ASSETS WITH REFERENCE TO
THE RIGHTS OF SUCCESSIVE PART PURCHASERS AND INCUMBRANCERS.
THAT equality is equity is a favorite maxim, especially in
the administration of assets insufficient to satisfy all demands,
but another maxim, as old as the law itself, quz prior est ternpore,potier est jure, embodies a principle which equity has
always recognized. "First come, first served," is a free and
easy translation, which is nevertheless quite accurate.
A legal maxim is the most general of general rules, and
really indicates but the point of view from which a Judge
looks upon the facts of a case. The question here discussed
has been considered from both points of view, and with such
variety of opinion that it may be worth while to review the
cases. The conclusion which seems upon the whole the most
reasonable, I would state, in the following proposition: If a
paramount incumbrancerof two funds, by his election of remedies,
disappoints a junior creditor, who has a lien upon one of them
only, the latter shall, to that extent, be substituted to the lien of the
paramount incumbrance upon the other fund bound by it, as
against the debtor and all claiming under him, by lien or title, subsequent in time.
Illustration: A tract of land is mortgaged to A., and then
a portion is mortgaged to B., and afterwards the remainder
to C. If A. ihakes his mortgage debt out of the land mortgaged to B., whose lien is thus extinguished, B. has a right
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to use A.'s lien upon the land included in C.'s mortgage, if
this is subsequent in time to his own; but if C.'s mortgage
is prior in time, his equity is superior to B.'s.
It has been law for centuries, that persons whose estates are
bound by a common in cumbrance should contribute towards
its payment. Where, however, the question arose between
the grantor of a portion of such estate, who had himself
created the incumbrance, or his heir, and purchasers, the Year
Books are not so clear, though it was soon settled, that, so
far as the grantor himself was concerned, he could not have
contribution from the grantee. In Trin. 17 Ed. II. (edition
of 1678), 550 (1324), a scirefacias had been brought against
an heir upon his ancestor's recognizance and the sheriff had
returned to a ft. fa. that the heir had nothing. The question debated was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a scire
facias against the terre-tenants, and it was held that so long
as the heir had assets, the tenants could not be charged.
(ScRoPE, J. " Sil eust suy le scire facias vers les terres ten-

entz, il ne le eust pas en avant qe le heir eust este garny et
tanqe le heir eit, assez les tenantz ne serront pas charges et
puis qe a le fieri facias le breve fuit retorn qe le heir navoit
rie' ad pres6ss per qi il cov6t que les tenz touz furet chaungez
(chargez), etc.") Whether the heir was charged, however, as
the ancestor, who was bound by his own act and liable for
his own debt, or as a terre-tenant, and thus chargeable for his
proportion, cannot be considered as settled, as appears from a
dictum of FYNCH.EDEN, J., in Hil. 48 Ed. 1_1. 5 (1375), "Car
si un home fait statute marehant a un autre et alien sa terre
per parcel a divers persons et retient part en sa maine demesn' et il devie et son heire entr', jeo die, q' cestuy a qui
le statute fuit fait n'avera mye execuc' entierement de les
terres l'heir mes solement per son proc' issint que il charge
owelnent (equally) chescun pur son porciodi que il ad, etc. ;"
which Broke, Abr. Suit & Contribution 12, 18, doubts, on the
authority of the earlier case; and Mr. Biddle, in his address
before the Philadelphia Law Academy on Contribution.
among Terre-tenants (1868), agrees with 2 Wins. Saunders, 10,
note, that the opinion of FYNCIIEDEN was more consistent
with the feudal system.
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It was but a step to give the terre-tenant, whose land had
been taken in execution, appropriate relief by audita querela
and scirefacias, against the creditor and the other terre-tenants who should be contributory. Thus, it was said arguendo
in East. 17 H. VII. 6, "Mes si le recognisor fait feffement a
plusieurs puis le recognisance et exec' e' sue vers un des
feoffees tantum il ser' aid per audita querela per c' q' il est
lede p's' torcieus execfi suir p' c' q' il n'est chargeable forsque
selon (solon) l'rate de sa terre." And we read in the same
year, 22, "Et fuit dit ibidem q' si le recognisor face feffement a' s divers hoffies et le recognisee suit execue' des terres
de Pun des feffees tantum, il puit in tie] cas avoir audita
querela et fair le recognisee suir exec' vers l'auters feofibes et
issint que fair lour parties estre contributoriespur l'portion (sed
quaere hoe); mes au moinz il semble que il disehargera bien
sa terre solong le rate." In 23 I. VIII, 40, cited Bro. Abr.,
Audita Querela, 39, it was said, "Home seisie de * * acres
es lie en statute marchant et fait feoffement a several persons et execucion est sue vers lun del feoffes, 6 avera audita
querela sur son surmise daver lauters feofees destre contributioni ove luy. Mes if ekecucion soit sue vers le conisor
mesme il navera tiel contribucion, car ce est sur son act demesne." (See also p. 44.) And the law was settled in Harbert's Case, 3 Co. 11, b, where on a scirefaciassur recognisance
to the Crown, the Exchequer entered a general judgment by
default against the heir of the conusor, although most of the
land had been aliend by the ancestor (see s. c. Moor, 169),
it was held, citing Gawdie's Case, more fully mentioned in
Moor, 169, that the heir could have no contribution from the
grantees, for haeres est alter ipse et filius est pars patris, even
if the purchasers took without valuable consideration; but
in case no assets descended, it was added, that "when land
shall be charged by any lien, the charge ought to be equal,
and one alone shall not bear all the burden, and the law in
this point is grounded on great equity." A reason given is
that the statutes, 11 Ed. I. Acton Burnell and 13 Ed. I. stat.
3, De Mercatoribus, provided that execution should be levied
of all the lands of the conusor; but this argument would
equally apply whether the heir had assets or not. The
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decision may more safely be rested on the ground, that the
grantees of one who has charged his land with an incumbrance,
may justly throw the whole burden upon him who created
it, and may assert this right as well against a volunteer who
takes cam onere. The judgment, however, should not have
been entered generally, but, as the case was settled, no judgment was pronounced in error.
It seems to be assumed, not only in Harbert's Case, but in
the Year Books, that each terre-tenant bad the right to compel equal contribution from all the others, without regard to
the time of their respective purchases, by audita querela and
scire facias after an extent, whereby the plaintiff's recovery
was delayed until he sued execution against the whole land.
"So, in this manner," says Coke, " every one shall be contribitorie, hoe est, the land of every terre-tenant shall be equally
extended." Lord PLUNKETT, indeed, in Hartly v. O'Flaherty,
Ll. & G. Temp. Plunkett, 213, considered that the question of
the effect of priority of title was left open in Harbert's Case,
in spite of the general language of the cases cited, and stated
that he could find no discussion of it anywhere, or any allusion to it, even in the statutes 16 & 17 Car. II. c. 5, and 22 &
23 Car. II. c. 2, which altered the practice by allowing the
execution to go on, saving to the party whose lands are extended his remedy by contribution. It is singular, but true,
that the question was never raised between successive grantees
of parcels of the same incumbered tract, but it wag assumed
by bench and bar alike, that all should contribute, as is
shown by the italicized words in the above citations from the
authorities: Ross v. Pope, PJowd. 72. Hence, a strange inconsistency. For, though the conusor of a statute might alien
Whiteacre to A., and then Blackacre to B., so long as he
retained Redacre, "en sa maine demesn," sufficient to pay the
debt, A. and B. were secure; yet if Redacre were conveyed
to C., then A., B., and C. would contribute," owelment chescun
pur son porcion." Thus, the grantee of incumbered property
could never know whether he would or would not be called
upon for contribution, for the question would depend upon
the mere accident of his grantor selling the balance of the
land so charged. It seems illogical that A., with an admitted
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right against his grantor to throw the burden of the charge
upon his remaining land, should be worse off as against the
subsequent grantees, who need not, according to Harbert's
Case, be purchasers for value.
The Court of Chancery, in dealing with such questions,
adopted, with few modifications, the rulings of the Courts of
Law, the more readily as the maxim that equality is equity
is favored by a Chancellor: Harvey v. Woodhouse, W. Kel. 6 ;
Long v. ghort, 1 P. Wins. 403. " The doctrine of equality,"
said EYRE, C. B., "operates more effectually in this Court
than in a Court of Law. The difficulty in Coke's cases was,
how to make them contribute. They were put to their audita
querela or scire facias :" Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, in the
Equity Exchequer, 1 Cox. 818. So, at law, a surety could
only be compelled to contribute to his co-surety for his
aliquot proportion, though other sureties might be insolvent:
Cowell v. Edwards, 2 B. & P. 268.
In fact, as early as Elizabeth's reign, Chancery would enjoin
the grantee of a rent-charge from levying the entire rent upon
a parcel, Cary, 3, and although we meet with suits at common
law for contribution at a later time, Erle v. Mullineux, 2
Bulst. 14, Blackstone v. Martin, 3 Id. 805, the advantages of
equitable procedure and remedies were recognized.
It often bqcame necessary, for example, to apportion a charge
between tenant for life and remainder-man, to decide between
heir and devisee, or in cases where the number of interests
involved rendered the common-law remedy tedious or inadequate: White v. White, 9 Ves. 555; Queen v. Colborne, Cary,
159; Dolman v. Vavasour, Id. 132; Anon., Id. 32; Cf. remarks of SCROPE, J., in 17 Ed.*IT. 551, and Rich v. Barker,
Hard. 131 ; Case de Loddon Bridge, W. Jones, 273 ; cases of
contribution to repair public bridges. Especially convenient
was the equitable administration of the assets of decedent's
estates as between heir, devisee, legatee, and creditors by
simple contract or specialty. The procedure of the common law was inadequate for the adjustment of conflicting
rights, and yet many of the rules of equity were grounded in
the common law. Thus in 1315, where the conusor of a statute died, having appointed the cognisee his executor, who
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administered upon assets sufficient to pay the debt, it was
held that he could not afterwards have execution of the land
descended to the heir: Trin. 8 Ed. IL, p. 282. See Trin. 7 R.
II., cited in Bellewe's Cases, Executions. The converse was
decided in 1664, in Armitage v. Metcalf, 1 Chan. Cas. 74, where
an heir who was compelled to pay his ancestor's bond was
reimbursed by the executor out of the personalty; though
other cases distinguished between an heir and a devisee: Corvish v. Mew, 1 Chan. Cas. 271; Hem v. Merick, 2 Salk. 416.
Equity, it was said, will take away one man's unreasonable
gain in order to make up another's loss, and he who receives
the advantage ought to make the satisfaction: Anon., 2 Chan.
Cas. 4; Culpepper v. Aston, Id. 115. So, where lands charged
with an annuity were sold for the payment of debts, the annuitant was decreed relief from other land: Kennoule v. Bedford, 1 Chan. Cas. 295.
Thus, side by side with the doctrine of contribution, grew
up the kindred theory of marshalling, by which a party who
has two funds to satisfy his demand, is not permitted, by his
election of remedies, to disappoint another who can resort
to but one of them: Tlimmer v. Bayne, 9 Ves. 209 ; Webb v.
Smith, 30 Ch. Div. 192. The principle was elaborated by
Lord ELDON, after consultation with Lord REDESDALE, in Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves. 382; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 228; but, as we
have seen, it was of early date, especially in the administration of the estates of decedents or insolvents. In the case last
cited, Cooper had mortgaged his freehold, with a covenant to
procure admittance to a copyhold, and surrender the same, as
further security to the mortgagee. Before doing so he died,
and his heirs were admitted to the copyhold and surrendered
to the mortgagee. The personal estate having been exhausted
by payment to the mortgagee, the question arose on a creditor's
bill, whether the simple contract creditors were entitled to
have the copyhold marshalled to the extent to which they
were disappointed of the personalty; the contest concerned
not so much the general principle as its application to a copyhold, which it was argued was not technical assets and not
liable for debts further than by express contract. It was
held, however, that the doctrine of marshalling applies when-

MARSHALLING ASSETS.

ever there are two funds to be administered, entirely irrespective of their contractualliability. It is needless to remark that
the rule of Aldrich v. Cooper has always been followed as a
clear principle of equity, but its application in England gives
rise to an inconsistency similar to that which we have noticed
in cases of contribution at law.
If A. mortgages Whiteacre and Blakacre to B., and then
conveys Whiteacre to C., the latter has an equity as against
A. and B., that B. shall have recourse first to Blackacre, but
if A. conveys Blackacre to D., then Whiteacre and Blackaere
must contribute pro rata to pay B. Such, we have seen, is
the rule at law. Suppose that the conveyance to C. is by the
way of mortgage, the same rule obviously applies with a like
result, for B. has two funds liable for his debt while C. has
but one; B. therefore is restricted to Blackacre, or to reach
the same and with stricter justice to B., C. is subrogated, after
B. is paid, to B.'s lien against Blackacre. If this is a right at
all, C. cannot be divested of it by any act of A., to which he
does not assent, such as a conveyance or mortgage to D., a
stranger. But in such case, the debtor having parted with
all of his estate or equity of redemption, the doctrine, of equity
in England is that C. and D. have equal equities, and therefore should equally contribute.
In Barnes v. .acster, 1 Y. & C. Oh. 401 (1842), Racster
mortgaged his land, consisting of Foxhall coppice and lot
No. 82, as follows: In 1792, Foxhall to Barnes; in 1795, Foxhall to Hartwright; in 1800, Foxhall and No. 82 to Barnes;
to secure as well the first and further advances; and in 1804,
Foxhall and No. 32, to Williams, the subsequent incumbrancers taking with notice. The question arose in Barnes's
foreclosure, whether, as No. 82 was sufficient to meet the
whole of Barnes's claim, Hartwright could, as against Williams,
compel Barnes to resort thereto, thus leaving Hartwright the
first incumbrancer on Foxhall. It was argued in his behalf,
that in 1800, before the subsequent mortgage was made to
Williams, Hartwright had acquired a right of which no subsequent dealings of the mortgagor with Williams could deprive hirh. Vice-Chancellor KNIGHT BRUCE decided however
that Barnes should be paid from the proceeds of Fcxhall and
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No. 32, according to their amounts, that the residue of the

first fund should be paid to Hartwright and the residue of
the second to Williams.
While it is true that the Vice-Chancellor reserved the question of what the rights of Hartwright and Wrilliams would
have been had Barnes's security upon No. 32 preceded and not
followed llartwright's security upon Foxhall, his opinion
is broad enough to cover that case also, and indeed when it
actually arose in Bugden v. Bignold, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 377 (1843),
it was similarly decided.
Bignold took a mortgage of freehold, and afterwards of
the freehold and copyhold estates for an additional advance,
after which the freehold subject to the prior mortgage was
mortgaged to Round, and finally the copyhold was mortgaged
to Bugden without notice of the prior mortgage thereof to Bignold. Round and Bugden both claimed the proceeds of the
copyhold estate, and, as in Barnes v. Racster, it was held that
Round lent his money not only without notice of the security on the copyhold, but without notice of its existence at all
and without prospect of any benefit from it. Bugden, however, was an innocent purchaser for value. Therefore the
Bignold second mortgage should be charged, pari passu, on
both freehold and copyhold. Upon reargument, the case of
Titley v. Davies, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 399, decided by Lord HARDWICKE in 1743, was relied on. In that case, Jenyns mortgaged to Shepherd an estate at Linwood, an estate at Wrestminster, and certain fee farm rents. He then mortgaged
Linwood to Titley; then sold the rents to Peyton, and finally
mortgaged Westminster to Davies. Titley paid off Shepherd's mortgage, and was allowed to hold all that was included in it, until he was paid not only Shepherd's mortgage
but his own also. While this case is complicated by the
manner in which it arose, so far as Titley was concerned, the
result was precisely the same as if Shepherd had been paid by
a sale of Linwood under foreclosure, and Titley had then been
subrogated to the mortgage as against Peyton and Davies,
whose rights were acquired subsequently to Titley's, and it is
submitted with deference as the case is otherwise explained
by eminent judges, that the decision of Lord HARDWICKE in
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this case, and Lanoy v. Athol, 2 Atk. 446, should have led
to a different conclusion in the cases cited.
That Barnes v. _Racster did not meet with the unqualified
approval of the profession is apparent from a criticism in the
Jurist, Vol. 7, Pt. II. p. 109, although, together with the later
case of Bugden v. Bignold, it is supported by a reviewer in
The Law Times, I. p. 397, July 15, 1843, who agrees with
the first impression of the Vice-Chancellor in the latter case,
that Bugden being an innocent purchaser for value, should be
paid in full from the proceeds of the copyhold. It is admitted, however, that either view is inconsistent with Titley
v. Davies.
The general creditors of a bankrupt, however, have no such
supervening equity as to object to such marshalling. Thus,
in Gibson v. Seagrim, 20 Beav. 614 (1855), Seagrim mortgaged his land to Godwin, with certain stock as additional
security; he then mortgaged his land to Gibson; Godwin,
and a prior mortgagee sold the land, and the balance, including
the proceeds of the stock, was paid to Seagrim's assignee in
bankruptcy, against whom Gibson claimed that the balance
should be paid him, as Godwin had two securities whilc Gibson
had but one, and so RoMILLY, M. R., decreed. S. P. by SUGDEN,
L. C., Baldwin v. Belcher, 3 Drew. & War. 173 (1842). In
Anstey v. Newman, 39 L. J. Ch. 769 (1870), a mortgagee of
land, a portion of which was included in a prior voluntary
settlement, was required to resort first to the unsettled land,
because the voluntary settlement was good as against the
subsequent unsecured creditors, though void as to the mortgagee.
In Sober v. Kemp, 6 Hare 155 (1847), a vendee of premises
included in a mortgage, paid it, took an assignment, and filed
a bill against his grantor's devisee and several mortgagees of
the other premises included in the first mortgage. It was
held by Vice-Chancellor WIGRAM that the plaintiff was entitled to the successive foreclosure of all the subsequent mortgages in default of redemption, on the ground that the mortgagees had no greater rights than their mortgagor.
It was'said, however, by Vice-Chancellor TuRNER, in T'dd
v. Lister, 10 Hare 157 (1852), that the cases decided since
VOL. XXXVI.-96
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Aldrich v. Cooper had not affected that decision, but it is impossible to study the opinions in Barnes v. .?aester, and Bugden v. Bignold, without concurring in the criticism of KENNEDY,

J., in Cowden's Estate, 1 Pa. St. 267 (1845), who points

out that the Vice-Chanceflor in the former case speaks as if
the right of the party claiming to have the assets or securities
marshalled, depended on a contract made with him to that
end, whereas marshalling seldom depends upon contract, but
upon " mere principles of equity and general justice," as is said
by Mr. Justice STORY, in 2 Equity, § 1234. Mr. Justice KENNEDY proves this very conclusively by the case of Aldrich v.
Cooper itself, and the illustration employed by Lord ELDON,
who effectually disposed of this very argument urged in behalf of the defendants that the copyhold estates, which were
the subject of the suit, "were not liable to debts further than
by express contract." (8 Ves. 885) Lord ELDON held in so
many words at p. 389, that the application of the fund did
not depend upon its being assets "either by will, or by. contract, inter vivos, but upon the ground that the specialty or
mortgage-creditor having two funds, shall not by his will resort to that by going to which he will disappoint as just a
creditor who cannot resort to any other." It is true that
both Lord ELDON, in Aldrich v. Cooper, and Lord HIARDWICKE,
in Lanoy v. Athol, 2 Atk. 446, confined their opinions to
cases where no third person was concerned, and it has been
attempted as a conclusion therefrom, to exclude from the operation of the rule, the case of a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer of some portion of the estate covered by the first
lien. Lord ELDON's caution was characteristic, while Lord
IIARDWICKE'S opinion is clearly shown by the case of Titley v.
-Davies, supra. Judge KENNEDY speaks of Barnes v. Racster,

as laying down a new doctrine; and indeed the Vice-Chancellor in that case seems to suppose that the equity only arises
on filing the bill (see 1 Law Times, 397), but it is submitted
that there is no principle or authority to support this theory.
In Mower's Trusts L. R., 8 Eq. 110 (1869), funds A. and B.
were mortgaged to Watson; then A. alone to Sustin, and
finally A. and B. to William, subject to the payment of the
two former. Fund A. was absorbed in payment of Watson's
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mortgage, and it was held by Lord RoMILLY that B. should
be applied to Sustin's mortgage in priority to Williams's. No
opinion was delivered by the Master of the Rolls, and it is
only possible to reconcile the decision with Barnes v. .Racster
with which he formerly said that he agreed (Gibson v. Seagrim, 20 Beav. 614), by distinguishing it on the ground that
nothing was included in the third mortgage by its terms, save
the surplus of both funds after the payment of both prior
mortgages. It may be a question, however, whether such
weight should be given to the wording of a mortgage of funds
already mortgaged, which would naturally be said to be subject to the payment of the prior charges. The doctrine of
the consolidation of mortgages is similar to tacking, but has
been sometimes, though erroneously, believed to be an outgrowth of the principle of marshalling as applied in T'tley v.
Davies; this, however, with deference to the opinion of Lord
HATHERLEY, in Wellesley v. lornington, 17 W. R. 355. In
England, a Court of Equity will not allowa mortgagor to get
back one of several mortgaged estates, unless he pays the
mortgagee all that is due him, although a portion of his debt
might be secured upon an entirely different property. And
persons deriving title from the mortgagor, such as subsequent
purchasers, or mortgagees of one, or a portion of one of the
mortgaged estates, are held to take subject to the same equity
of the mortgagee or his assignee, even though under assignment subsequent in date to the creation of the second mortgage: Vint v. Padget, 2 De G. &J. 611 ; Beevor v. Luck, L. R. 4
Eq. 537. Indeed, the rule was once extended tu a case
where not only the assignment of the mortgage, but even the
mortgage itself being subsequent, was held to operate against
an intervening mortgage of one estate: Tassell v. Smith, 2
De G. & J. 713; but this was afterwards overruled in Mills
v. Jennings, 13 Ch. Div. 639; s. c. in House of Lords, 6 Ap.
Cases, 698. See article in 69 Law Times, 94; 72 Id. 219; 6
Canadian L. T. 409; 19 Canada Law T. 121; 26 Solicitors'
Journal, 356. The doctrine has not been followed in the
United States, save in a few cases (Jones on Mortgages, § 1083),
and is important in our present discussion, because the English cases fbilowing Barnes v. acster are based upon the
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equity of the "intervening' orsubsequent" bonafide" incumbrancer, which argument might be supposed to apply with
far greater force against the consolidation of mortgages, as indeed appears from Lord HATHERLEY'S opinion in Wdlesley v.
lhfornington, supra. However, as was forcibly -aid by the
Chancellor in that case, when asked to oi'errule Barnes v.
?acster, " the question of principle is not so easy as all that,"
and he added that if this should ever be done, it must be on
very strong grounds.
In Ireland, the decisions proceed upon the other theory;
thus, in 11akmilton v. .Royse, 2 Sclh. & Lef. 315 (1805), REDESDALE, Lord Chancellor, held that a purchaser takes subject to
all equities to which the vendor was subject, and of which
the purchaser had notice, and therefore where one took under
a deed containing a recital of judgments affecting the land
which he bought, and other land previously settled, he was
bound not only with notice of the judgments but of the equities existing under the settlement, to have the settled property exonerated. Lord Chancellor SUGDEN, in Averall v.
Wade, Ll. & G. Temp. Sug. 252 (1835), indeed, thought that
this case went too far as against a subseque.t purchaser, but
the two decisions are entirely consistent. In the latter, the
owner of several estates being indebted by judgments, settled
one of his estates for valuable consideration, and afterwards
acknowledged other judgments. It was held that the prior
judgment should be thrown altogether on the unsettled estates, and that the subsequent judgment-creditors had no
right to make the settled estates contribute. It was argued
that, by virtue of the covenant, the grantee of the settled estate was, at the date of the settlement, entitled to have the
prior judgments paid by the unsettled estates, and this right
could not be divested by subsequent dealings between the
settlor and third persons. Lord Chancellor SUGDEN seemed to
think that such would be the case, even without a covenant
that the estate was free from incumbrance, but put it on the
much higher ground, as he called it, of the covenant, which
equity would enforce by doing specifically what should have
been done, and that no subsequent judgment-creditor could
disturb that right, after it had attached, by demanding that
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the settled estates should contribute to the prior judgments.
In .Hartlyv. O'-Flaherty, LI. & G. temp. Plunk. 208 (1833),
reversing s. c.Beatty, 61, a collector of excise settled his
property upon his marriage, then having bought Huntingtower, mortgaged it to Lord Callan. He was then proved a
defaulter, and died ten years after. His son, tenant in tail
under the settlement, sold a portion of the land to Scott, and
mortgaged other portion to Lewis. The crown debt having
been satisfied out of Huntingtower (which, by various proceedings under the Irish law, was made subject to it), it was
held that the mortgagee had no equity to enforce contribution by Scott and Lewis, who derived title for value under a
settlement prior to the mortgage. "If the mortgagor," said
Lord PLUNKETT, "sells a portion of his equity of redemption
for valuable or good consideration, the entire residue undisposed of by him is applicable in the first instance to the discharge of the mortgage, and in ease of the bonafide purchaser,
and it is contrary to every principle ofjustice, to say that a person afterwaids purchasing from that mortgagor, shall be in
a better situation than the mortgagor himself with respect to
any of his rights." Nor did the absence from the settlement
of a covenant against incumbrances alter the equities of the
case as between the several persons claiming title as purchasers under different deeds. See also Be Fox, 5 Ir. Ch. 541,
and Be Jones, 2 Id. 544.
In Lawder's Estate, 11 Ir. Ch.846 (1861), Barnes v. Raester,
however, was recognised as correct, and was said to establish
no new principle, while in Borke's Estate, 15 Id. 316 (1865),
it was intimated that Barnes v. Racster was inconsistent with
Hartly v. O'Flaherty,which is undoubtedly so. The priorities in the latter case were the reverse of those in the case at
bar. In Borke's Estate, X. and Y. were mortgaged in 1846,
and X. was conveyed in 1856, in consideration of natural love
and alection. Y. was mortgaged in 1860, and upon sale
thereof, the proceeds were sufficient to pay the first but not
the second incumbrance. It was held that the conveyance of
X., being voluntary, the mortgagee of Y. was entitled either
to contribution or full payment from X. (see as to rights of
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volunteers, Dolphin v. Aylward, L. R. 4 H. L. 502; Anstey v.
A'ewinan, 39 L. J. Oh. 769).
In Lynch's -Dstate,1Ir. Rep. Eq. 396 (1867), the incumbrances
in the order of time were, first, a mortgage of two tracts,
second, a judgment registered as a mortgage against one of
them, and third, a judgment affecting both. The first lien
exhausted the land on which alone the judgment mortgage
was a lien, and the other tract was accordingly marshalled in
its favor, postponing the latest lien.
In Canada, where the earlier Irish and English eases were
both considered, the former were followed, and the theory
adopted that the record of the paramount incumbrance was
notice to a subsequent part purchaser of equities existing in
favor of the intervening liens: Boucher v. Smith, 9 Grant,
347; and further, in accordance with what is believed to be
correct theory, that the paramount incumbrancer is not bound
in the absence of express notice from a junior, to retain all
his security intact: Trust Co. v. Shaw, 16 Id. 446.
In the civil law, a third theory is adopted. If land is mortgaged to a creditor and then sold in parcels at different times
to different persons, the first purchaser cannot, by paying the
debt, acquire the right to be subrogated to the creditor as
against the second or third purchasers, because he can apply
the right acquired by subrogation only to that portion of the
incumbered property which he himself has purchased. Nqor,
according to the civil law, has the first purchaser any claim
for contribution as against the subsequent purchaser: his only
remedy being a personal action against his vendor. It is
argued, in support of this doctrine, that a purchaser who pays
an incumbrance upon his property does so to secure his own
possession, and has no intention to acquire the creditor's right
against other property. A subsequent creditor, on the other
hand, who pays a prior creditor, does so for the express purpose of acquiring his rights. But the purchaser of incumbered property is not a creditor in that sense. He has merely
an action against his vendor. In another sense he is himself
a debtor, or rather the property which he purchased is liable
for the debt, and he has his choice either to give up that
property or to make himself the debtor and to pay the
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debt. In this aspect of the case, it seems immaterial
whether he stipulates for express subrogation or not, that
is, as we may say, whether he pays the debt or takes an
assignment of the lien, and such seems the result of the authorities as cited by Dixon on Subrogation, Oh. II., where
they are ably considered. The learned author inclines to the
opinion that the English rule of ratable contribution, as
stated by Judge Story, Equity, § 1233, is founded upon a
broader view of the principles of equity than either the civil
law or the theory of exoneration in the inverse order of conveyance (as adopted by Chancellor KENT), and claims that it
furnishes the only fixed measure for the respective liabilities
of the several parties. Certainly the rule of the civil law
furnishes no fixed standard ; for the burden falls on whom the
paramount incumbrancer chooses to place it. It is submitted,
however, that the rule here maintained and first laid down in
this country by Chancellor KENT both establishes a practical
test of liability and avoid; the theoretical inconsistency of
the English rule.
In Clowes v. Dickenson, 5 Johns. Ch. 235 (1821), it was said
that if there are several purchasers in succession at different
times, there is no equality, and consequently no contribution
between the purchasers to the discharge of the common incumbrance. The last purchaser sits in the seat of his grantor, as
the heir represents his ancestor, and must take the land with
all its equitable burdens ; "it cannot be in the power of the
debtor," argued the Chancellor, "by the act of assigning or
selling his remaining lands, to throw the burden of the judgment or a ratable part of it, back upon" a first purchaser.
In Clowes v. Dickenson, the rule was in fact stated obiter,
but it has been very generally followed in the United States.
We propose to consider it as illustrated by the Pennsylvania
cases, as they are numerous and conflicting, and besides
remarkable in this, that some of them adopt unwittingly the
rule of the civil law.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1823, then composed 6f Judges TILGHMAN, GIBSON, and DUNCAN, followed
Clowes v. Dickenson in Nailer v. Stanley, 10 S. & R. 450.
Nailer and Stanley had successively purchased of Vanleer,
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subject to a judgment which was afterwards levied of Stanley's
land, who brought assumpsit against Nailer to recover his proportionateshare of the valueof the land sold. The Court denied
the right to recover, and held in addition that the remedy in
such case would not be assumpsit but a special action in rem,
the judgment in which would be de terris. It was supposed
at one time, that this case was overruled by PresbyterianCorporation v. Wallace, 3 Rawle, 109 (1831), but the question was
reconsidered in Cowden's -Estate,1 Pa. St. 267 (1845), and the
rule of .Nailerv. Stanley elaborately vindicated. It had previously been approved in Ziegler v. Long, 2 Watts, 205 (1834),
and Taylor v. _3Taris, 5 Rawle, 51 (1835). In Ransey's Appeal,
2 Watts, 228 (1834), a mortgagee was substituted, as against
the general creditors of the intestate mortgagor, to the right
of a prior judgment-creditor whose lien extended to the balance of the debtor's land sold by his administrator, and also
to the judgment of a bank which had a lien upon some of its
own stock held by the debtor. As this case has often been misunderstood, it is worth while to notice that when Chief Justice
GIBSON said that the doctrine was one of mere benevolence
and not to be extended to the infringement of legal rights, he
meant merely (as is apparent from the illustration used and
the case at bar), that the doctrine was not to be employed to
infiringe the legal right of the paramount incumbrancer to
make his money as safely, quickly and conveniently as he
pleased, but it was expressly said that the legal rights of all
the creditors are "s u b ordinate to equities which affected the
debtor whom they collectively represent," that is, that subrogation cannot be invoked as long as the first lien creditor is
unsatisfied: Kyner v. Kyner, 6 Watts, 227; -Hoover v. Epley,
52 Pa. St. 522; Bank v. Petty, S. Ct. Penn., January 3, 1887;
Neff's Appeal, 9 W. & S.36.
In Pennsylvania, the Act of April 22, 1856, P. L. 534, protects the right of the paramount judgment-creditor, and at the
same time affords a remedy before a judicial sale at his instance, for the purchasers, by providing for the payment and
assignment of his judgment and execution under the control
of the Court: Arna's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 72; Phelps's Appeal,
98 Id. 546; Milligan's Appeal, 104 Id. 503.
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.M$ller v. Jacobs, 3 Watts, 477 (1835), was a contest over the
proceeds' of a sheriff's sale of land in Perry County, mortgaged successively to the plaintiff and the defendant. The
bond accompanying the plaintiff's mortgage was then entered
in Philadelphia as a lien upon property of the mortgagor
there situated, after which judgments were obtained in Philadelphia, subsequent to both mortgages. The defendant gave
notice to the plaintiff to make his money out of the Philadelphia estate, but the plaintiff released the Philadelphia
estate from the lien of his judgment in order that a private
sale might be made of that estate; which being done, the
subsequent judgments were satisfied from the proceeds, and
the balance received by the owner. The Court below held
that it was the common case of a creditor who, having two
funds, was under an equitable obligation to keep that which
was exclusively within his reach intact for the benefit of
another creditor who had but one. The fund was therefore
awarded to the defendant, but this was reversed in an opinion
delivered by GIBSON, C. J., who held that the paramount creditor having two funds was not bound to make room for the
admission of one, by incommoding another who has equal
claims. In that predicament, it is at his option to stand still.
Between subsequent lien-creditors on distinct parts of the
general fund, the legal course of execution is not to be disturbed, and a Chancellor suffers the general creditor to take
satisfaction in the way most conducive to his convenience or
the gratification of his caprice. This assumes that the equities of the parties are balanced, while, as was argued, the
mortgages were liens in Perry before the judgments were
obtained in Philadelphia, so that the defendant, being prior in
time, was first in right, to which Judge GIBSON answered:
"But what has his lien in Perry County to do with an estate
not bound by it?" It may be replied, nothing; but his right
is not enforceable as his lien, but as and through another's.
It is by substitution only that he has any claim, and that
arises because the prior incumbrancer has injured him by exhausting one security when he might have taken another.
Besides, in .Mi/er v. Jacobs, the paramount incumbrancer did
not stand still, for despite express notice he relinquished his
VOL. XXXVI.-97
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lien upon the Philadelphia property. While a prior incumbrancer is not bound by record notice of a junior lien upon his
own security to retain the whole thereof intact, he is bound
upon notice, to use his own security, so as not to diminish
another's. Such was the decision in the same year in Taylor
v. Maris, 5 Rawle, 51 (1835), and such, notwithstanding M3iller v. Jacobs, is the doctrine of Horning's Appeal, 904 a. St.
388 ; licllvaine v. Assurance Co., 93 Id. 30; Wilbur's Appeal,
S. C. Penn., April 1, 1881, and many other cases.
It is true that Miller v. Jacobs, having been argued before
three judges, a bare majority of the court, from whom Judge
IIUSTOX dissented, was reargued in Jacobs v. Miller, 5 Watts,
208 (1836), in his absence. The grounds of the former
decision were affirmed, and in addition stress was given
to an alleged agreement of Clark to suspend the registry
of his mortgage (which was unaccompanied by a warrant
to confess judgment). This agreement was neither noticed
in the former opinion nor relied upon in argument, and indeed is so vaguely stated in the report of the evidence that its
precise import cannot be determined. At all events, both
opinions in Miller v. Jacobs put the decision squarely upon
the ground stated in 5 Watts, 209, that "Clark lent his money
on the direct security of the mortgaged premises, and that
the party claiming under him can look to nothing else ;"
which is really the broad question we are discussing.
In 1840, Hastings's Case, 10 Watts, 303, was decided upon
the contrary principle. There, Hastings mortgaged to
Humes lot No. 68, which was subject to Evans's judgment,
after which the debtor, Hastings, acquired other property
upon which the Evans judgment, by revival, also became a
lien. Then followed Alexander's judgment, and the properties having been sold by the sheriff, the contest was between
Humes and Alexander, thus making a case similar to Barnes
v. _?acster. It was held, per K.qNEDY, J., that the equity of
substitution existed on the part of Humes, before Alexander
acquired his lien, and was therefore not afficted or destroyed
by it. "It is not easy," says Judge HARE, in his note to
Aldrich v. Cooper, 2 Lead. Cases in Equity, 228," to reconcile
-the decision of Miller v. Jacobs with the principle laid down
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in -Hastings'sCase. N~or does it, as Chief Justice GIBSON seems
to have supposed, result exclusively from the obligation of
the paramount lien creditor not to cover the property of the
debtor from his other creditors. It has another root, that
who of several claimaints on a fund shall prevail, ought not
to depend on the caprice of one of them, but on a settled rule.
If a mortgagee who acquires a judgment lien on all the real
estate of the mortgagor after the execution of a second mortgage can, by the mere exercise of his volition, postpone the
second mortgage to a junior incumbrancer, or vice versa, there
is no reason why he should not turn the power to account by
exercising it in favor of the highest bidder," and Dixon on
Subrogation, 84, notes a like objection to this, the civil law
doctrine.
The principle of .Uastings'sCase, rather than that of Miller
v. Jacobs, was followed in Bruner's Appeal, 7 W. & S. 269
(1844), though neither case was cited. Cooper owned two
lots bound by Righter's judgment, of date February 14; and
conveyed lot A. to Eagle on February 17. Two days thereafter, Giller recovered another judgment against Cooper,
which bound only lot B. Then Eagle conveyed to Bruner,
who also took an assignment of the Righter judgment, a lien
on both lots, and Giller's assignee sold lot B. at sheriff's sale,
whereupon the proceeds were claimed by both Bruner and
Giller's assignees. Obviously, Eagle, under whom Bruner
claimed, acquired A. before Giller obtained his junior judgment against B., and therefore Giller had no equity superior
to Bruner. Judge KENNEDY held that it would be singularlyunjust and inequitable, if a prior purchaser of real estate for a
valuable consideration should not have a preference in all
cases against a subsequent lien or judgment creditor, citing
Averall v. Wade, supra. Had Eagle, however, on purchasing,
withheld some of the consideration money to satisfy the judgment, he or his assignee would to that extent have had no
claim on the proceeds of the other lot.
In Cowden's Estate, 1 Pa. St. 267 (1845), Judge KENNEDY
,again delivered, the opinion of the Court, of which GIBSON
was then Chief Justice. This case well deserves to be called
the leading case on the subject in Pennsylvania, as the theory
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received very attentive consideration, though the facts are
complicated and poorly reported. Cowden, as his father's
devisee, owned several tracts of land in Northumberland and
Lycoming counties, subject to the charge of debts and legacies, and afterwards at different times severally incumbered
by various mortgages and judgments. Judge KENNEDY discusses the rule of Aldrich v. Cooper, and approves thedoctrine
of Chancellor KENT in Clowes v. Dickinson,in spite of the contrary opinion of Judge Story, and the authority of Barnes v.
.Bacster, and says, in summing up, "It does seem to be difficult, if not almost impossible, to conceive upon what principle
of reason or sound sense the second creditor is to be divested
or deprived of his right to have the securities marshalled so
as to have the whole of his debt paid after the coming in of
the third person the same as he had a right previously
thereto." It was therefore held that the debts and legacies
should be paid from the proceeds of the land which was last
incumbered, so that the latest incumbrancers should be paid
only so far as they might be without disturbing the rights
of the prior incumbrancers, "who being prior in time, may
be said to have a superiority of right" (compare Conrad "v.
Harrison, 3 Leigh, 532).
Ebenhardt's Appeal, 8 W. & S. 327, was decided a few
months before Cowden's Estate, and the same judge delivered
the opinion, but upon another principle. Rice owned three
lots of ground subject to Hein's and Bender'sjudgments. He
conveyed No. 3 to Spinner for $400, of which $300 was secured by a note, stated to be "on account of Hein's lien."
Waechter and Probst obtained judgments against Rice, which
became liens on Nos. 1 and 2, and afterwards Ebenhardt obtained judgments against Spinner. Lots 1 and 2 having been
sold at sheriff's sale, the fund was awarded to Hein and
Bender, while Waechter and Probst, not being paid in full,
were ordered to be subrogated to Hein's judgment lien on lot
No. 3, to the amount of the $300 note. It might seem to
follow from the cases cited, that after No. 3 was conveyed to
Spinner by Rice, none of the subsequent judgments entered
against Rice; liens only on Nos. 1 and 2, which he retained,
could have any equitable claim as against Spinner; in other
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words that Waechter and Probst are in a different position
from Bender, whose judgment was obtained before the conveyance. But Spinner having expressly agreed to pay $300 of
the Hein judgment, there is nothing inequitable in making him
or his property contribute that much, of course to the betterment of Waechter et al., whose judgments moreover were
prior to Ebenhardt's. Judge KENNEDY, however, determined
the case upon other grounds, viz., the remark of Lord ELDON,
in Exparte Kendall, 17 Ves. 520, that a creditor having a demand against two debtors (not two funds belonging to the
same debtor), cannot be compelled by a creditor of one only to
seek payment first from the other ; the argument being that
Rice was not the owner of both funds but of one, while
Spinner, a stranger, owned the other. But, as Judge SERGEANT, dissenting, remarked, Spinner bought the land subject
to the judgment, and his creditors can be in no better position. Hein had a lien on two funds, one of which, subject
thereto, became Spinner's afterwards. Had Spinner originally owned No. 3, and Hein obtained a joint judgment
against both Rice and Spinner, tijen the facts might call for
the application -of the rule of Exparte Kendall. Judge BELL,
in commenting upon this case in the later case of Dunn v.
Olney, 14 Pa. St. 223 (in which it is submitted a like error is
made), agrees with Judge SERGEANT, that sufficient weight
was not given to the agreement of Spinner to pay the judgment pro tanto from the money withheld. If indeed we are
not to give this effect 'to Spinner's note, the case should
have been decided on the other ground, that the conveyance
to Spinner ante-dated the judgments of Waechter and
Probst.
Lloyd v. Galbraith,32 Pa. St. 103 (1858), bears a strong
resemblance to Ebenhardt's Appeal, and indeed was decided
upon its authority. Galbraith owned three tracts of land,
the Swan farm, lot No. 13, and the Anderson farm, all of
which were bound by Elliott's judgment for $1000, entered
May 26, 1856. He conveyed the Swan farm to Prosser for
$3200 on-November 18, 1856, taking notes for $2200 of the
purchase-money, after which Bell & Co. obtained a judgment
on January 5, 1857, against Galbraith, which of course bound
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No. 13, and the Anderson farm. Then on March 18, 1857,
Bell, Smitn & Co., who had bought the notes given by Prosser
to Galbraith, obtained judgment upon them against Prosser,
and this judgment bound the Swan farm in the hands of
Prosser, and subject to the Elliott judgment. Under these
circumstances Elliott issued execution against the Anderson
farm and lot 13, and the proceeds were paid to him. Bell &
Co. thereupon claimed to be substituted to the lien of Elliott
against the Swan farm. The case might perhaps have been
well decided on the ground suggested above and noted by
Judge PAXSON, in Milligan's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 503 (1884), in
speaking of Ebenhardt's Appeal, that as the conveyance to
Prosser had been made prior to the entry of Bell & Co.'sjudgment against Galbraith, Bell & Co. were not entitled to the
use of Elliott's judgment as against Prosser. Or better indeed, as Prosser had not paid the whole of the purchasemoney, the case might have come within a generally recognized
exception to the rule. For the whole doctrine of Nailer v.
Stanley, it will be remembered, rests upon the obligation of a
vendor of incumbered land to relieve it from the burden of
the incumbrance: but if the vendee agrees to pay the lien or
his ratable share of it or withholds so much of the purchasemoney to meet such payment, he clearly has no claim to exoneration, nor can his own judgment-creditor claim higher
rights. Such was the opinion of the Court in Zeigler v. Long,
2 Watts, 205 ; Bruner's Appeal, 7 W. & S. 269 ; In re 31eGill,
6 Pa. St. 504; Dunn v. Olney, 14 Id. 223; Carpenter v.
Koons, 20 Id. 222; Beddow v. DeWitt, 43 Id. 826; Dill's
Appeal, 3 Penny. 489; Wilbur's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 133
(S. Ct. April 1, 1881); while .Ebenhardt's Appeal, 8 W. & S.
827; Lloyd v. Galbraith, 32 Pa. St. 103 (with deference to
Judge STRONG'S opinion in JBeddow v. DeWitt); Conser's Appeal, 1 Penny. 128, appear opposed to this view, which might
also have been relied on in Blank's Appeal, 6 W. N. C. 25 (S.
Ct. March 11, 1878).
The rule of Ex parte Kendall has certainly been often misapplied, and even in itself deserves careful examination. It
is acknowledged that, if A. has a lien upon funds B. and C.,
and D. has a lien upon fund B. only, equity will compel

MARSHALLING ASSETS.

A. in favor of D., and against the common debtor of both, to
exhaust fund C. before impairing D.'s security, or what is the
same thing, to substitute D. to A.'s rights against B. This
rule Lord ELDON refused to apply to the case, where the two
funds were the property of two different debtors; i. e., if A. is
a creditor of B. and C., and D. a creditor of B. alone, A. cannot be compelled to satisfy his debt from C.'s property, in
order that D. may obtain payment from B.'s ; because in such
case C.'s property would be taken to pay B.'s debt to D.
To tlhis, however, there is the well recognized exception, that
if the relation of suretyship exists between B. and C., so that
B. is a surety for C.'s debt, A. may be compelled to make
him pay who is primarily liable, and leave the surety's property to pay the surety's debts: .Huston's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 485
(1871). The thought, however, which naturally suggests itself,
is that as between two joint debtors, he who pays the common
debt is entitled to contribution from the other of his share.
Considered relatively to each other, as to one-half of the debt,
each is primarily liable, as to the other half, secondarily; as
to one-half, a principal, as to the other a surety. Suppose
then in the case put, B. pays the whole of B. and C.'s debt to
A., he may enforce contribution from C. of his share, and
there is no injustice, consequently, in making C.'s property
pay that proportion of A.'s claim in the first instance. In
practice, however, it might be difficult to adjust the equities
between B. and C. in a case where they are complicated, as
often is, and always is assumed to be the case in partnerships:
.Knouf's Appeal, 91'Pa. St. 78. Equity, however, should not
hesitate to afford relief on account of any difficulty in the
way, especially as just here relief is most needed. A Court of
equity cannot, like a Court of common law, excuse its failure by pleading a lack of appropriate machinery, and the old
maxim of no wrong without a remedy meets with a practical
refutation.
In McGinnis's Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 445 (1851), Herchelroth
owned land in Cumberland and Franklin counties, both subject to MacLanahan's judgment. The next lien in Cumberland County was McGinnis's judgment, which was entered
four days before Johnston's judgment was obtained in Frank-
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lin. MacLanahan's judgment was paid from the proceeds of
the Cumberland estate, after which the Franklin estate was
sold by the sheriff, and McGinnis claimed there to be paid
the balance of his judgment in preference to Johnston's judgment, because prior in time. It was held, however, on the
authority of Miller v. Jacobs, 3 Watts, 477, that Johnston was
to be preferred, because McGinnis's lien in Cuinberland had
no connection with an estate in Franklin, bounded by liens
there. But, in McDevitt's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 373, McGinnis's
Appeal was distinguished on the ground that McGinnis should
have obtained an order of subrogation in Cumberland, before
applying to the Court in Franklin County. In the case last
cited, Devlin owned real estate in Chester and Philadelphia,
incumbered by Claghorn's judgment; after which Carson obtained judgment in Philadelphia, and then Devlin mortgaged
his Chester property to McDevitt, and gave a judgment to
Kitchenman. Carson then took an assignment of the Claghorn judgment in both counties, and both properties were sold
at sheriff's sale. It was held that when Carson's judgment
was entered in Philadelphia, Claghorn had two funds to resort to, while Carson had but one, so that, had a sale then
taken place, there could have been no conflict of interests.
Carson having the right of subrogation then, the recording of
the McDevitt mortgage, and the entry of Kitchenman's judgment a year later, could not alter the status of Carson's judgment, and accordingly the fund in Chester County was
awarded to Carson as assignee of Claghorn, so that his own
judgment might come in as the first lien in Philadelphia.
In like manner was decided -Delaware Canal's Appeal, 38
Pa. St. 512. There, a judgment debtor mortgaged a portion
of his land to the canal company, after which another judgment was recovered against him. The land included in the
mortgage was sold upon execution and the mortgagee was
subrogated to the rights of the firstlien creditor against other
land, although the mortgagee might, by entering up the bond
accompanying its mortgage, have acquired a lien upon all the
mortgagor's land, and obtained a legal priority to the subsequent judgments.

STRONG, J., held that the judgment-credi-

tors subsequent to the mortgage had no rights superior to
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their debtor, but were affected by all the equities existing
against him when they obtained their judgment. Compare
_I'echling's Appeal, S. Ct. Penna. Oct. 19, 1885, which seems
an inconsistent but hurriedly decided case.
But, again, in 1877, the Supreme Court reverted to the
other theory in Hoff's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 40. Addams obtained a judgment against Phillips on April 11, 1870. In
1878 Phillips mortgaged the land to Hoff, and in 1874
bought other property. The Addams judgment was revived
in March, 1875, and thus became a lien upon both tracts of
Phillips. In July following Phillips sold the last acquired
tract to Reiff for value, Reiff having no actual knowledge of
the judgment. In 1876 the land mortgaged to Hoff was
sold by the sheriff to pay the Addams judgment, and Hoff
claimed to be subrogated to the Addams judgment against
the land sold to Reiff, raising a similar question to that in
Hastingss Case, supra. Chief Justice AGNEW, citing 31iller v.
Jacobs, said that when Phillips sold to Reiff, he had a right
to sell, and Reiff to buy, so far as Hoff was concerned. Hoff
had no right at law to interfere, had no lien upon the after
acquired property, and his mortgage was not taken in view
of that property. The only risk which Reiff took on himself
was the Addams judgment, and when that was paid, as it
was by the sale of the other land, his was free of the lien.
Further, Phillips stood in the relation of principal to Reiff,
for by the covenant in his deed, implied in the words "grant,
bargain and sell," lie was bound to remove the incumbrance.
Reiff therefore was superior to a surety, was a bonafide purchaser of the land with no actual knowledge of the Addams
judgment, and his equity was therefore superior to Hoff's.
But it is one thing to pay a debt, another to divest a lien.
Ramsy's Appeal, 2 Watts, 232. The actual payment of the
judgment was nothing, if in equity another creditor was entitled to use its lien. Reiff had record notice of the judgment,
and could not claim that the creditor should have recourse
first to the property remaining, for an examination there
would have disclosed the prior Hoff mortgage. The argument from the covenants implied in Phillips's deed to Reiff is
aside from the question. Put it that Reiff became a surety
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for Phillips, what effect can that have upon Hoff, who at the
date of the revival of the Addams judgment, had a right to
have the assets marshalled? How could Phillips and Reiff
deprive hin of that right by a bargain and sale of the property ?
-or, as is stated in 84 Pa. St. 43, was Reiff prior in time
to Hoff. That, were it true, would end the case; but it was
not, as may be seen by a comparison of the dates when their
rights attached.
In Milligan's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 503 (1884), 1toff's Appeal
was not noticed. Carothers owned lots 1, 2, and 3, subject to
Chalfant's mortgage. lIe successively mortgaged No. I to
Shaw, -No.2 to Stewart (who afterwards bought it in under his
mortge), and then conveyed No. 3 to Milligan. Carothers
becoming bankrupt, his assignee sold No. 1, and applied the
proceeds to the payment of the Chalfant mortgage. Shaw,
whose mortgage was discharged by the sale, was held entitled
to use the Chalfant mortgage against the tracts conveyed to
Stewart and Alilligan. Shaw was entitled to have the first
lien paid out of the remaining land of Carothers, and this
equity Carothers could not defeat by his subsequent dealings
with Stewart and Milligan, who had record notice of Shaw's
equity.
In Robeson's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 628 (1888), the facts were
essentially the same as in ITHf's Appeal. Graham owned the
Hale tract, subject to the Woods judgment, and mortgaged it
to Robeson in 1872 and May 1875. He acquired the Decatur
tract in August 1875, and the Woodsjudgment by revival the
same year became a lien on that also. In 1876 he mortgaged
the Decatur tract to Meyers, and both tracts were sold by the
sheriff to pay the Woods judgment. Robeson claimed the
residue in preference to MIeyers', and was held entitled, on
the principle of McDevitt's Appeal and Hastings's Case; and
Itoffs' Appeal was distinguished, on the ground that Reiff, in
the latter case, was a purchaser, not a mortgagee, and his deed
contained an implied covenant by the grantor to indemnify
him. But there is really no such distinction. The mortgage
in Robeson's Appeal was in the ordinary form, and the covenant is implied from the words in the mortgage, just as in a
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conveyance. Indeed the leading case on the Act of 1715,
(ratz v. .Ewalt, 2 Binn. 95, was the case of a mortgage, and
the appellee's argument in Bobeson's Appeal (see 21 W. N. 0.
519), expressly urged that no such distinction could be drawn.
Nor can it be said that Reiff was not bound by record notice
of the judgment, because, as was said of the appellee in Robeson's Appeal, he should be presumed to have known what was
clearly exhibited by the record. While we may therefore
approve of the decision in that case, it may be regretted that
it was not placed upon proper grounds, by overruling Hoi's
Appeal, which is in conflict with the earlier decisions.
A reference (by no means exhaustive) to the decisions in
other States is added in a note.
JOHN MARSHALL GEST.
In most of the United States the
rule laid down by Chancellor KENT
has been consistently followed: NEw
YORK: James v. Hubbard, 1 Paige,
228 ; Jenkins v. Freyer, 4Id. 53 ; Guion
v. Knapp, 6 Id. 35; Patty v. Pease, 8
Id. 277; Skeel v. Spraker, Id. 182;
S ryver v. Teller, 9 Id. 173; Thomas
v. Machine Co., 43 Hun, 487. CO..ECTICUT: Hunt v. 3ansfield, 31 Conn.
488. MICnimAN: Cooper v. Bigley, 13

Mich. 463; Sibley v. Baker, 23 Id.
312. ILLINOIS: Iglehart v. Cran, 42
Ill. 267; Alexander v. Welch, 10 Ill.
App. 181; Lock v. Fu/ford, 52 Ill.
166; Young v. M'organ, 89 Id. 199;
Crawford v. Richeson, 101 Id. 351.
MAIsE: Holden v. Pike, 24 Me. 427;
Sheperd v. Adams, 32 Id. 63. NEW
HAMPSHIRE: Brown v. Simons, 44 N.
H. 475 (annotated by Judge REDFIELD,
in 3 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, N. S.

154).

VIRINIA: Henkle v. Allstradt,

4 Gratt. 284; Jones v. M1rick, 8 Id.
179. VERMONT: Lyman v. Lyman, 32
Vt. 79. COLORADO: Fassettv. Mlulock,
5 Col. 466. TERNESSEE: Parr v. Fuynbanks, 11 Lea, 391 ; Haunt v. Ewing, 12
Id. 519. INDIANA: .bllinine v. Bass,
29 Fed. Rep. 632. The English rule is
followed in KEN-TUCKY: Dickey v.
Thompson, 8 B. Mon. 312 (reluctantly
following prior cases). IOWA: Bates
v. Ruddick, 2 Iowa, 430; Griffith v.
Lovell, 26 Id. 226 ; Barney v. Myers,
28 Id. 477. The cases seem to conflict
in OnoI: Cary v. Folsom, 14 Ohio,
365; Green v. Ramage, 18 Id. 428.
MASSACHUSETTS: Allen v. Clark, 17
Pick. 47; Parkman v. Velch, 19 Id.
231 ; Chase v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 143 ;
and NEW JERSEY: Shannon V. M11arselis,
Sax. 413; Wi koff v. Davis, 3 Gr. Ch.
224; Gaskillv. Wales, 36 N. J. Eq.
527; Pancoast v. Ducal, 26 Id. 445;
Ely v. Perrine, 2 Id. 396.

